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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH

THIOKOL CHEMICAL
TION, a corporation,

CORPORA-

Plaintiff-Respondent
and Cross-Appellant,

vs.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-1ntervenor
and Cross-Appellant,

Case No.
9912

vs.
LE GRANDE PETERSON,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
The instant action was brought in the First Judicial District Court, Box Elder County, by cross-appellant, Thiokol
Chemical Corporation, attacking a privilege tax assessment
made against it, by Box Elder County, on the basis that ( 1)
the incidence of the tax was upon the United States; (2)
that Thiokol was not subject to the tax; (3) the statute
imposing the tax, 59-13-73, U. C. A. 1953, was unconstituSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2

tional as being discriminatory, and ( 4) that the tax was
discriminatorily applied. The United States intervened
and the Utah State Attorney General was served pursuant
to 78-33-11, U. C. A. 1953. The appellant appeals from a
decision adverse to it on point ( 4) mentioned and crossappellants, Thiokol Chemical Corporation and the United
States, appeal essentially from an adverse decision on
points ( 1) , ( 2) and ( 3) above mentioned.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The cross-appellant, Thiokol Chemical Corporation,
paid the sum of $125,802.29 assessed taxes under protest
to Box Elder County, and then sued to recover the return
of the monies paid under protest challenging the assessment on several grounds. The United States intervened
and the Attorney General of Utah appeared in the action,
pursuant to 78-33-11, U. C. A. 1953. Trial was had, without jury, in the First Judicial District Court, Box Elder
County, State of Utah, on February 6-7 and March 12,
1963. On April 12, 1963, the Honorable Lewis Jones en·
tered his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law (R. 245)
and Judgment (R. 252). The court entered judgment against
the appellant for the return of all the tax money paid
under protest and interest thereon. The appellant appeals
from so much of the judgment as orders return to respon·
dents and cross-appellants of the protest payment, and respondents and cross-appellants have appealed from the
court's decision to the extent it holds Thiokol Chemical
Corporation to be subject to the Utah privilege tax, 59-13·
73, U. C. A. 1953, and that the statute is constitutional.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant seeks reversal of the trial court's decision awarding the respondent return of all tax monies paid
under protest, or, in the alternative, reversal with instructions to the trial court to equalize the taxes paid by respondent with other persons taxed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff below and respondent-cross-appellant
herein, Thiokol Chemical Corporation, is a Delaware corporation, authorized to do business in Utah, and was at
the pertinent times herein doing business in Box Elder
County (R. 204). Box Elder County officials, operating
pursuant to 59-13-73, U. C. A. 1953, issued tax assessment
No. D975 against the Thiokol Chemical Corporation assessing certain personal property and fixtures at the Thiokol
plant in Brigham City. (R. 204-206 and Exhibit A to plaintiff's complaint.) The assessment of tax due was in the
sum of $125,801.29, and was for the taxable year 1961. On
November 29, 1961, the Thiokol Chemical Corporation paid
the tax assessment under protest (R. 205), and on May 21,
1962, commenced this action for return of the money paid
(R. 195). Subsequently, the United States intervened alleging ownership of the assessed property, challenging the
constitutionality of the tax, and claiming a specific pecuniary interest in the litigation (R. 214-18). The Utah Attorney General entered under 78-33-11, U. C. A. 1953.
The title to the property assessed is in the United
~tates, but the Thiokol Chemical Corporation has possesmon of the property under the terms of a contract with
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the United States, and used the property for the purposes
of performing its contract with the United States (Pl. Ex.
1). The contract between Thiokol and the United States
is a cost-plus-a fixed-fee contract (Pl. Ex. 6), and provides that the United States can supply certain special
tooling and other equipment to Thiokol to be used "primarily" for the work Thiokol is to perform under its contract
for the United States (Pl. Ex. 6, R. 246). Nothing in the
contract indicates that Thiokol must use the property "exclusively" for the work being done for the United States
(R. 79). The court found that pursuant to the contract,
Thiokol would receive a profit of 3.76% of the cost of performing the contract during 1961, and that the fee paid
Thiokol by the United States for the year 1961 was in excess of $4,000,000.00. The court also found that the "cost"
figure included overhead and some indirect overhead costs
of Thiokol (R. 246) .1 The percentage figure for profit is
a percentage of the overall cost of performing the contract
(R. 153).
Thiokol's contract is a research and development contract for the production of the first stage of the Minuteman
missile (R. 151). Stages two and three of the missile production phase are produced by other private contractors
who dovetail their work to fit with that of Thiokol (R.
151). The final assembly of the missile occurs at Boeing
Plant 77 at Hill Air Force Base, from where it is transported to firing silos ( R. 152) .
The contract between the Air Force and Thiokol is
lThe actual fee as testified to was $5,304,018.00 fo·r 1961, and $4,891.·
740.00 for 1960 (R. 153).
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6
generally written in broad terms. The Air Force Contract
Administrator testified, ( R. 69) :

HQ. And did the contract specify exactly how
that research and development would be conducted?
"A.
terms.

No, sir, these contracts are in very broad

''Q. Specifying the end that was desired
rather than the means by which the end would be
achieved?
''A. That is correct, sir."
The Air Force only exercised general overall control,
but left the technical performance of the contract up to
Thiokol. In this regard, the trial judge expressly found,
(R.246):

"That in accordance with the provisions of said
contract, the United States Air Force maintained
general supervisory control over the activities of
plaintiff in carrying out said contracts. However,
plaintiff was expected to use initiative, diligence
and managerial discretion so long as the best in.;.
terests of the United States were served in the performance of the specific terms of the contracts of
the United States under which it received and used
the assessed property."
Thiokol was to be reimbursed by the United States for
the cost of taxes it had to pay to Box Elder County; this
was by virtue of a provision in the contract between Thiokol and the United States (Pl. Ex. 1).
Thiokol is a profit corporation (R. 90, 246); it has
been in existence since the late 1920's and conducts substantial operations in other fields besides government
contracting (R. 92). Although salaries of personnel work-
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6
ing on the subject contract are "approved costs" under
the contract, management salaries are not dictated by the
United States (R. 94).
The court received into evidence several special use
leases (Exhibits 1-c, 1-h, 1-i, 1-j, 1-o, 1-q, 1-r, 1-u and
1-v) by which the State of Utah leased state lands to private persons or corporations for various purposes. Of
those leases, Exhibits 1-c, 1-q, 1-r, 1-u and 1-v were taxed
in accordance with Section 59-13-73, U. C. A. 1953; however, the other leases received in evidence were not taxed (R.
248) . All the leases covered lands owned by the State and
located in various counties of the State. On the following
leases not taxed under 59-13-73, U. C. A. 1953, evidence
was presented that some commercial use was being made
of the leased lands: Exhibit 1-H (a one acre experimental
well being used in conjunction with turkey growing operations); 1-I (Sunset Beach resort); 1-J (a resort area);
1-0, (Sunset Beach resort). Leases 1-I, 1-J and 1-0 were
not granted with exclusive possession and 1-J was open
to the public at large (Def. Ex. 10). ~he court did not
find that this possible disparity of state leases was sufficient to constitute discrimination. It noted, (R. 200):

"* * * The court can't bring itself to the
point of making a finding of fact in this case that
because the tax people of Utah have only assessed
the Southern Pacific Railroad on an easement and
the Texas Company on three or four oil leases, and
Thiokol, that this practice has been so acquiesced
in by the tax people as to constitute discrimination
in the legal sense. * * *"
The evidence further disclosed that for the year in
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question, and as a standard practice, the State Land Board
would make a list of state lands to which the State still
held legal title, but which had been sold to private persons
under contract (Plaintiff's Ex. 3 & 3A). This list would
show the sale certificate number, the name and address of
the purchaser, the legal description of the property, the
purchase price and the equity of the purchaser. These lists
are then eventually forwarded to the local county assessors
for use in making assessments on state lands. This procedure was followed prior to the enactment of 59-13-73, U.
C. A. 1953, and is based upon 59-2-2, U. C. A. 1953. It
was stipulated that none of the lands listed on Exhibit 3A
for the year 1961 were taxed under 59-13-73, U. C. A. 1953.
Plaintiffs' Exhibits 12 and 13 describe 190 parcels of state
land sold under contract to private persons and stipulate
to the testimony of Lee E. Young and Mark H. Crystal,
employees of the State Land Board, as to use of the lands
by the contract vendees. It was stipulated that none of
these parcels were taxed under 59-13-73, U. C. A. 1953,
but were taxed under 59-2-2, U. C. A. 1953, but only to
the extent of the owners' equity rather than their full
value, which is applicable to properties taxed under 5913-73, U. C. A. 1953. No evidence was introduced to show
that comparable federal land leases or sales were being
taxed any differently. It was upon this evidence of state
lands under contract not being taxed that the trial court
found that the tax under 59-13-73, U. C. A. 1953, was being discriminatorily applied (R. 249, para. 20).
The evidence showed that the Box Elder County Assessor had not personally inspected the parcels of state land
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under contract of sale in Box Elder County (R. 249, para.
18), but assessed these lands upon purchaser's equity alone.
The State Tax Commission conducted an Assessor's
School on December lOth and 11th, 1959. (Exhibit 7, p.
24, etc.) At that school the local assessors were instructed
to assess for tax purposes leases and possessory interests
held by third persons of otherwise exempt entities. No instructions were given that assessors were to exclude lands
sold by the State under contract; rather, "government
owned" lands and facilities were expressly mentioned as
being subject to the new privilege tax. (Exhibit 7, p. 24,
etc.).
The policy of the State Tax Commission was to direct
taxation of all property encompassed by 59-13-73, U. C. A.
1953 (R. 98). Mr. Max H. Kerr, Director of the Property
Tax Division of the State Tax Commission, expressly
noted, ( R. 98) :
"Q. Is that policy any different as to any
other tax exempt entity that may own the property?
Say like state property, for example.
"A. There's no difference between whether
it is owned by the federal government or any other
so-called exempt owner.
"Q. Otherwise then there is a general across·
the-board exercise of this tax rather than attempting to pinpoint it into any particular tax exempt
entity; is that correct?
"A. That is true."

Mining companies (R. 98) and utilities (R. 101, Def.
Ex. 10), were taxed where they possessed state leased prop·
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erty. A specific direction was made by the Tax Commission to the Box Elder County Assessor advising him that
a gravel pit was owned by Brigham City and leased, and
that it was to be taxed (Pl. Ex. 9).
The State specifically undertook a program of re-evaluation to determine property escaping taxation, including
but not limited to that taxable under 59-13-73, U. C. A.
1953 (R. 114, 118, 119).
Some properties owned by tax exempt entities in Box
Elder County, being specifically Brigham City and Box
Elder County School District, that were leased to commercial enterprises were not taxed (R. 247). However, the
Box Elder Assessor testified that this was an oversight (R.
179, 180) , and this evidence was not contradicted. His testimony disclosed, ( R. 179) :
"A. Oversight, I think, yes, sir. Since we did
not receive any records from the Recorder's office
of any property listed in their name, we don't have
a record of it in our office, and it's been an oversight there.
"Q. But you did have this letter which you
read earlier dated January 6, 1960, from the State
Tax Commission, did you not, Mr. Peterson?
"A. That's right."
The same witness further commented that he had
failed to put a piece of property on the assessment rolls,
that he had inquired of the Tax Commission as to its taxability, apparently due to oversight (R. 179), nor was he
aware of any other assessable property not assessed ( R.
181).
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Although the court apparently found one piece of property in Box Elder County to be taxable under 59-13-73, U.
C. A. 1953, being the property leased by S. L. Jeppson,
Mr. Jeppson expressly testified this was "primarily" his
home (R. 192).
Finally, the evidence disclosed that the reason that
state lands under contract of sale were not taxed under
59-13-73, U. C. A. 1953, was because their use was not
known nor was the Box Elder County Assessor aware of
their taxable status, but at least one employee of the State
Tax Commission felt them covered, and no policy of exemption had been adopted by the State Tax Commission.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE THIOKOL CHEMICAL CORPORATION
WAS TAXABLE UNDER SECTION 59-13-73,
U. C. A. 1953, FOR THE PROPERTY POSSESSED IN CONNECTION WITH A GOVERNMENT CONTRACT AND DID NOT ACT UNDER THE CONTRACT AS THE ALTER EGO
OF THE UNITED STATES.
The Thiokol Chemical Corporation is an independent,
private, profit seeking corporation, incorporated under the
laws of Delaware, and authorized to do business in the
State of Utah. The property assessed in the instant case,
although federally owned, was in the possession of the
Thiokol Chemical Corporation to be used "primarily" by
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them in carrying out a profitable government contract.
The Thiokol Corporation was free to use whatever engineering and production techniques it desired so long as the
end product met the requirements of the Air Force and
specifically the Minuteman missile program. The contract
between Thiokol and the United States (Pl. Ex. 6), provides, at page 1, that the government will provide :
••Item 1 - Such Government-owned severable
facilities as have been or may hereafter be furnished to the Contractor by the Government from
the Government Reserve."
The machines and equipment are supplied to plaintiff and
plaintiff has complete use of the equipment to carry out
its functions. Part 9 of Contract, at page 13, reads :
"The facilities furnished the Contractor under
Supplemental Agreement Nr 10 are furnished primarily for the performance of Contract Nr AF 33
( 600) -36514 and supplemental agreements hereto."
Etc.
The contractor has the right to inspect and reject all unsuitable facilities (Contract No. 15 Facilities Clause 2).
The contractor has responsibility for maintenance, and has
no liability for "loss of or damage to the" property ( Facilities p. 3) . The right of possession to the property is complete in Thiokol for the carrying out of its functions under the contract. Under such circumstances, the Thiokol
Chemical Corporation clearly had the beneficial control and
possession of the property assessed and taxed. The trial
court expressly found such as a matter of fact and ruled
that as a matter of law Thiokol exercised sufficient control
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and possession to be taxable under the Utah Privilege Tax
Statute.
59-13-73, U. C. A. 1953, provides:
"From and after the effective date of this act
there is imposed and there shall be collected a tax
upon the possession or other beneficial use enjoyed
by any private individual, association, or corporation of any property, real or personal, which for any
reason is exempt from taxation, when such property
is used in connection with a business conducted for
profit, except where the use is by way of a concession in or relative to the use of a public airport,
park, fairground, or similar property which is available as a matter of right to the use of the general
public, or where the possessor or user is a religious,
educational or charitable organization or the proceeds of such use or possession inure to the benefit
of such religious, educational or charitable organization and not to the benefit of any other individual
association or corporation. No tax shall be imposed
upon the possession or other beneficial use of public
lands occupied under the terms of mineral or grazing leases or permits issued by the United States
or the state of Utah or upon any easement unless
the lease, permit or easement entitles the lessee or
permittee to exclusive possession of the premises
to which the lease, permit or easement relates."
It should be noted that the tax under this statute is

imposed, not upon the tax exempt entity, but upon the non
tax-exempt individual, association, or corporation having
the possession or beneficial use of the property. Clearly,
therefore, the tax was properly assessed and collected from
Thiokol, unless some aspect of its relationship with the
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United States under its contract otherwise prevented the
imposition of the tax.
The Utah statute was patterned after and is very similar to, a Michigan statute (Public Act of Mich., 189, 1953).
The Michigan Statute was challenged in three cases going
before the United States Supreme Court in 1958. The constitutionality of the Michigan statute was upheld in these
three cases. In United States v. Township of Muskegon,
355 U. S. 484 ( 1958), one of the cases above referred to,
the property possessed by the contractor, who was taxed,
was held by the contractor pursuant to a government contract, and its possession was for the purpose of satisfying
such contract. The contractor and the United States argued that this was property not properly taxable under the
U. S. Constitution2 since it would in effect lay the tax at
the doorstep of the United States. In rejecting the contention, the Supreme Court commented, noting that the possession of the contractor was no different merely because
the property was possessed by virtue of a government contract than other property it might use in conducting its
business. It stated:
''If under certain conditions the State can tax
Continental for use of government property in connection with its business conducted for profit-and
as set forth in No. 26 we are of the opinion that it
can-the fact that Continental was carrying out a
contract with the Government does not materially
alter the case. Continental was still acting as a private enterprise selling goods to the United States.
rrbe ~chigan courts had previously ruled that the statute applied to such
J)OS!IeSslons.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14
In a certain loose way it might be called an 'instrumentality' of the United States, but no more so than
any other private party supplying goods for his own
gain to the Government. * * *"
The use of the property in the instant case enables
Thiokol to make a profit of between four and five million
dollars a year. Although the performance of the contract
is for the United States, the benefit is a mutual one between obligee and obligor. The Thiokol Chemical Company
in no way acts as the alter ego of the United States. The
independent profit 1notive is clearly the motive of Thiokol's
activities rather than the governmental interest that would
be present were this an alter ego situation. In the Muskegon case, supra, the court stated the facts of that case
which are extremely similar to those of the instant case:
"* * * In 1952 it [United States] granted
Continental Motors Corporation the right to use this
plant in the course of performing several supply
contracts Continental had with the Government. No
rent was charged as such but Continental agreed
not to include any part of the cost of the facilities
furnished by the Government in the price of the
goods supplied under the contracts."

The court further noted that it makes no difference that
the property is held under a permit or contract rather than
a formal lease. Certainly, the possession and beneficial use
of the property in the instant case being of such a nature
as to allow the plaintiff to carry out its contract and receive a fixed fee is a beneficial use or possession. In American Motors Corp. v. Kenosha, 356 U. S. 21 (1958), the
United States Supreme Court affirmed a tax of a general
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pl'operty nature by the City of Kenosha. The tax, however,
was imposed irrespective of title, upon the beneficial use.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court in the same case at 274
Wise. 316, 80 N. W. 2d 363 ( 1957) found that a sufficient
beneficial use from the following use of the property, and
stated:
"Under the terms of this contract the Company,
in its private capacity, acquires materials needed
for performance of the contract. In procuring such
materials it does not act as purchasing agent for
the Government and the Government incurs no responsibility to the vendor for payment of the purchase price. If a partial payment is made, or has
previously been made under the contract, title to
all such property vests in the Government upon its
acquisition by the Company."
Utah cases have seemed to find a similar benefit to
government contractors sufficient to impose a sales or use
tax as the "ultimate consumer" of property to be used in
government contract. Olson Construction Co. v. Tax Commission, 12 U. 2d 42, 361 P. 2d 1112 ( 1961). There can
be no claim that Thiokol does not have sufficient interest
or use of the property to satisfy the statute.
In the trial court the United States and Thiokol attempted to bring themselves within the doctrine of United
States v. Livingston, 179 F. Supp. 9 (E.D.S.C. 1959) affirmed without opinion 364 U. S. 281 (1960). An analysis
of that case shows its inapplicability to the instant factual
situation. The case involved the imposition of the South
Carolina sales and use tax. The court had before it a contract between the Atomic Energy Commission and the Du-
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Pont Company. The contract concerned the construction of
an atomic energy plant. All materials used in construction
were purchased with appropriate funds, title passed to the
United States on purchase and only $1.00 profit was to be
given DuPont, and, finally, DuPont had authority to draw
directly from government bank balances. In commenting
on the contract in question, the lower federal court said:
"These provisions of the contract are sufficient
to show that the lengthy document is unusual. It
was entered into by a contractor without hope of
gain, except the nominal one dollar, payable upon
final completion of the contract, but upon whom
was imposed no risk of loss. DuPont was not even
required to lend its credit or its funds. That it was
contemplated that DuPont would act as the alter
ego of the Commission is further suggested by the
contract requirement that DuPont include in subcontracts a number of provisions applicable to public contracts. * * *"
In the instant case there is a profit motive by an independent business organization whose internal controls
and actions on the project are left to itself and are not intimately supervised by the United States so long as the
end product meets the consumptive needs of the United
States. Thiokol has complete freedom. Finally, no sales tax
is involved, but rather one obviously on beneficial use and
possession. In United States v. Boyd, 363 S. W. 193 (Tenn.
1962) , the Tennessee Supreme Court reviewed a suit to
recover taxes paid under protest. In rejecting the alter
ego theory advocated by the United States and, hence, the
Livingston case, supra, the court commented on the inap·
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plicability of that case to the usual government service
contract. The court noted :
"The main contention of the appellants is that
we are bound by the decision of the U. S. District
Court in United States v. Livingston, 179 F. Supp.
9, affirmed without opinion, 364 U. S. 281, 80 S.
Ct. 1611, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1719 (1959). That case involved a South Carolina sales and use tax upon DuPont Corp. in its operations under a similar contract with the A. E. C. We are not persuaded that
the holding of that case should be followed here,
because both in the facts and the South Carolina
and Tennessee taxing statutes substantial differences appear. There DuPont undertook to design,
construct, and operate a plant for the A. E. C. for
a fee of only $1.00. The Court in that case found
that DuPont entered the contract from motives of
public responsibility, and that it was the intention
of the parties that DuPont would act as agent or
'alter ego' of the A. E. C. in that project. The Court
concluded that DuPont itself lacked a separate taxable interest.
"We do not wish to ignore any patriotic motives
that may exist, but we find in this record no indication that the appellant Carbide continues its contract or that appellant Ferguson entered its contract
with any primary motive other than that of the normal business transaction. Carbide's yearly fee,
above allowable costs, is $2,751,000.00 and Ferguson's fee, negotiated from time to time, is equally
substantial as it appears in the supplemental agreements to the Ferguson contract. In addition, we
feel that Carbide, contrary to DuPont in the Livingston case is deriving substantial indirect benefit
that will enable it to maintain a position of indusSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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trial leadership as atomic energy finds more uses in
non-defense fields."
Similarly, in the present case, a large fee is paid, and
Thiokol is in competition with other companies in the missile industry, and has opportunity to gain a substantial position in the missile defense industry. The contract (p.
2-2) provides for rehnbursement of both direct costs and
indirect costs (except where the latter are purely without
direct relevance to the contract to be performed, or the
benefits so received are additional to the contract). A costplus-a-fixed-fee contract is provided for by Congress under
10 U. S. C. 2306 (d). Under such contracts for military
procurement, or other contracts under Title 10 U. S. C.,
Chapter 137, the contractor receives a fee based on the
percentage of estimated cost. Department of the Army
Pamphlet 27-153, Procurement Law, notes at page 170:
"The cost-plus-a-fixed-fee, or 'CPFF', contract
is a cost contract which provides a profit, called a
'fee', to the contractor in addition to the reimbursement of his allowable costs. The fee is 'fixed', i.e.,
it is a set sum, based on the estimated cost of performance of the contract. The fixed fee does not
vary with actual cost of performance, but may be
adjusted as a result of subsequent changes in the
work or services to be performed under the contract. The fixed fee must be approved by the Head
of a Procuring Activity or his designee and may
not be greater than 7 per cent of the estimated cost
of performance (exclusive of the fee) in contracts
generally, or 10 per cent of the estimated cost of
performance (exclusive of fee) in the case of experimental, developmental or research work, except
that fees up to 10 per cent and 15 per cent respec-
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tively may be authorized by the Secretary of the
Military Department or his designees. The term,
'fee', regarding architect-engineer type contracts is
used to designate the architect or engineer's costs of
performance and profit. This fee may not exceed
6 per cent (exclusive of the architect-engineer fees)
of the estimated cost of the part of the public works
or utility project to which the architect or engineering services pertain. Since the contractor's fee in
all CPFF contracts is based on estimated costs and
may not change with actual costs, accurate cost estimates are important."
Additionally, the Armed Services Procurement Regulations allow coverage for indirect costs. A.S.P .R. 15-203,
and the Comptroller General of the United States has ruled
that indirect costs, based on actual overhead, although renegotiated after performance, are allowable. 35 Comp. Gen.
434 (1956). Further, the Armed Services Procurement
Regulations recognize the "fee" as "profit". A.S.P .R. 3404.3(c). A cost-plus-fixed-fee contract guarantees a
"profit" to the contractor at a specified percentage. Because the profit is not wide open (nor the possibility of a
loss immediate), the plaintiff cannot contend the use of
the property taxed in the instant case was not for a business conducted "for a profit", and that they are somehow
the alter ego of the United States. To adopt the respondent's position would free every government contractor
from state taxation merely because public work was involved.
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POINT II.
THE SUBJECT ASSESSMENTS DO NOT INFRINGE UPON FEDERAL IMMUNITY FROM
STATE TAXATION.
The respondents and cross-appellants alleged in their
complaints that the Utah privilege tax violates the immunity of the Federal Government from state taxation. The
trial court ruled contrary to their contention. A simple examination of the pertinent provisions of the Utah statute,
59-13-73, U. C. A. 1953, demonstrates that the statute itself
places no direct tax upon the United States. The statute
imposes the tax "upon the possession or other beneficial
use enjoyed by any private individual, association, or corporation of any property, real or personal, which for any
reason is exempt from taxation, when such property is
used in connection with a business conducted for profit."
Consequently, the tax is imposed against the "individual association or corporation", not the United States or other tax
exempt agency. It is submitted that the instant statute
in no way places the incidence of the tax upon the United
States and, hence, does not fall within the category of taxes
outlawed by McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U. S. (4 Wheat.)
316 (1819); Weston v. City of Charleston, 27 U. S. (2
Pet.) 448 (1829). The Supreme Court of the United States
in Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U. S. 1 (1941), approved a sales tax imposed by Alabama on federal contractors who purchased supplies to be used in the construction
of government facilities, and which were purchased for the
purpose of satisfying government contracts. Under the
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contracts in question, as is the instant case, the tax burden
was passed on to the United States. In holding that such
taxation did not violate the prohibition against taxing the
United States, the Supreme Court stated:
"* * * The asserted right of the one to be
free of taxation by the other does not spell immunity from paying the added costs, attributable to the
taxation of those who furnish supplies to the Government and who have been granted no tax immunity."

The court further noted :
"We cannot say that the contractors were not,
or that the Government was, bound to pay the purchase price, or that the contractors were not the
purchasers on whom the statute lays the tax. The
added circumstance that they were bound by their
contract to furnish the purchased material to the
Government and entitled to be reimbursed by it for
the cost, including the tax, no more results in an
infringement of the Government immunity than did
the tax laid upon the contractor's gross receipts
from the Government in James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U. S. 134, * * *, supra. See Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, supra (260 U. S. 523, 524,
* * *); Trinity/arm Constr. Co. v. Grosjean,
supra (291 U. .S 472, * * *); Helvering v.
Gerhardt, supra (304 U. S. 416, * * *); Graves
v. Ne'W York, supra (306 U. S. 483, * * *) ."
Consequently, the plaintiff cannot argue that because,
under its contract with the United States, the latter picks
up the tab, this somehow changes the tax to one against
the United States. The tax is clearly on the user-possessor,
and under Section 59-13-75, U. C. A. 1953, does not become
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a lien on the property itself. In U. S. v. Allegheny, 322
U. S. 174 (1944), the Supreme Court again noted:

"* * * Nor is the validity of the tax dependent upon the ultimate resting place of the economic burden of the tax."
In the latter case, the court reserved for decision the question of whether a tax levied on the possession or beneficial
use of government property could be upheld. However, in
several recent cases, the United States Supreme Court has
expressly held that statutes almost identical with Section
59-13-73, U. C. A. 1953, did not violate the privilege of the
United States from taxation by states. The act involved
in some of the cases was Michigan Public Act 189, which
provided:
"When any real property which for any reason
is exempt from taxation is leased, loaned or otherwise made available to and used by a private individual, association or corporation in connection with
a business conducted for a profit, except where the
use is by way of a concession in or relative to the
use of a public airport, park, market, fair ground
or similar property which is available to the use of
the general public [sic], shall be subject to taxation
in the same amount and to the same extent as
though the lessee or user were the owner of such
property."
The similarity of the instant statute to the present Utah
statute is obvious. In United States v. City of Detroit, 355
U. S. 466 (1958), the United States Supreme Court upheld
the statute as against a claim, the same as that made below
by respondents, that the statute invades the province of
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federal immunity from local taxation. In the case, realty
was leased by Borg Warner Co. from the United States.
The court noted :
"* * * In general terms this statute, Public
Act 189 of 1953, provides that when tax-exempt
real property is used by a private party in a business conducted for profit the private party is subject to taxation to the same extent as though he
owned the property.

"* * *
"The Michigan statute challenged here imposes
a tax on private lessees and users of tax-exempt
property who use such property in a business conducted for profit. Any taxes due under the statute
are the personal obligation of the private lessee or
user. The owner is not liable for their payment nor
is the property itself subject to any lien if they remain unpaid. So far as the United States is concerned as the owner of the exempt property used
in this case it seems clear that there was no attempt
to levy against its property or treasury. * * *
"It is undoubtedly true, as the Government
points out, that it will not be able to secure as high
rentals if lessees are taxed for using its property.
But as this Court has ruled in James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U. S. 13, * * *, Alabama v.
King & Boozer, 314 U. S. 1, * * *, and numerous other cases, the imposition of an increased
financial burden on the Government does not by
itself, vitiate a state tax.
"* * *
"Today the United States does business with a
vast number of private parties. In this Court the
trend has been to reject immunizing these private
parties from nondiscriminatory state taxes as a
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matter of constitutional law. Cf. Penn-Dairies v.
Milk Control Commission, 318 U. S. 261, 270,
* * * Of course this is not to say that Con.
gress, acting within the proper scope of its power,
cannot confer immunity by statute where it does
not exist constitutionally. Wise and flexible adjust·
ment of intergovernmental tax immunity calls for
political and economic considerations of the greatest
difficulty and delicacy. Such complex problems are
ones which Congress is best qualified to resolve.
As the Government points out Congress has already
extensively legislated in this area by permitting
states to tax what would have otherwise been im·
mune. To hold that the tax imposed here on a pri·
vate business violates the Government's constitu.
tional tax immunity would improperly impair the
taxing power of the State."
A similar case to the instant one was United States v.
Township of Muskegon, 355 U. S. 484 (1958), where the
court noted, as respects the same Michigan tax statute:
"In this case the United States owns a manufacturing plant at Muskegon, Michigan. In 1952 it
granted Continental Motors Corporation the right
to use this plant in the course of performing several
supply contracts Continental had with the Govern-,
ment. * * *
"On January 1, 1954, Continental was assessed
a tax under Public Act 189. As in No. 26, this tax
was levied because of Continental's use of tax-exempt property in its private business and was measured by the value of the exempt property which it
was then using. Continental refused to pay the
tax and this suit was brought by state authorities
in a state court to recover the amount assessed. The
United States intervened, contending that the tax

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

25
was invalid because it imposed a levy on government property. But the lower court rejected this
contention and entered judgment for the plaintiffs.
The Michigan Supreme Court affirmed, 346 Mich.
:.!18, 77 N. W. 2d 799. \Ve noted probable jurisdiction of an appeal from this decision by both Continental and the United States, 352 U. S. 963, * * *,
and now affirm the judgment below on the basis of
our decision in No. 26.
''There are only two factual differences between this case and No. 26. First, Continental is
not using the property under a formal lease but
under a 'permit'; second, Continental is using the
property in the performance of its contracts with
the Government. We do not believe that either fact
compels a different result.
"Constitutional immunity from state taxation
does not rest on such insubstantial formalities as
whether the party using government property is
formally designated a 'lessee.' Otherwise immunity
could be conferred by a simple stroke of the draftsman's pen. * * *
"If under certain conditions the State can tax
Continental for use of government property in connection with its business conducted for profit and as set forth in No. 26 we are of the opinion
that it can - the fact that Continental was carrying out a contract with the Government does not
materially alter the case. Continental was still acting as a private enterprise selling goods to the
United States. In a certain loose way it might be
called an 'instrumentality' of the United States, but
no more so than any other private party supplying
goods for his own gain to the Government. In a
number of cases this Court has upheld state taxes
on the activities of contractors performing services
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for the United States even though they were closely
supervised in performing these functions by the
Government."
In City of Detroit V. Murray Corp., 355 U. S. 489
( 1958) , a third and companion case to the other two discussed, the court again had the same Michigan statute before it. The court noted:
"In 1952 Murray Corporation was acting as a
sub-contractor under a prime contract for the manufacture of airplane parts between two other private companies and the United States. From time
to time Murray received partial payments from the
two prime contractors as it performed its obligations under the subcontract. By agreement, title to
all parts, materials and work in process acquired
by Murray in performance of the subcontract vested
in the United States upon any such partial payment,
even though Murray retained possession.
"On January 1, 1952, the City of Detroit and
the County of Wayne, Michigan, each assessed a
tax against Murray which in part was based on the
value of materials and work in process in its possession to which the United States held legal title
under the title-vesting provisions of the subcontract.
Murray paid this part of each tax under protest and
then sued in a Federal District Court for a refund
from the city and county. It contended that full
title to the property was in the United States and
that the taxes infringed the Federal Government's
immunity from state taxation to the extent they
were based on such property. The Government intervened on Murray's behalf. * * *
"We believe that this case is also controlled by
the principles expressed in our opinion in Nos. 26
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and 87, ante, pp. 424 and 486, and that the taxes
challenged here do not violate the Constitution.
These taxes were not levied directly against the
United States or its property. To the contrary they
were imposed on Murray, a private corporation,
and there was no effect to hold the United States
or its property accountable. * * *

"* * *
·' * * * Of course the Government will eventu:-llly feel the financial burden of at least some
of the tax but the one principle in this area which
has heretofore been clearly settled is that the imposition of an increased financial burden on the
Government does not by itself invalidate a state
tax."
In American Motors Corp. v. Kenosha, 356 U. S. 21
(1958), the United States Supreme Court affirmed the
imposition of a personal property tax on a government
contractor on property he used carrying out a government
contract where legal title to the property was in the United
States, but the contractor had possession to enable him to
manufacture airplane parts.
The substance of all these cases was aptly summed up
in General Dynamics Corp. v. County of L. A., 330 P. 2d
794 (Cal. 1958), where the California Supreme Court
stated:
"It is now settled that a private contractor's
right to use government property may be made the
subject of a nondiscriminatory tax measured by the
value of the property used even though the economic
burden of the tax falls on the United States."
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Since the Utah statute, Section 59-13-73, does no more
than what the United States Supreme Court has allowed,
no claim that the immunity of the Federal Government has
been encroached upon can be sustained.
The annotation in 2 L. Ed. 2d 1789, notes that the present trend of decisions of the United States Supreme Court
has "been to reject immunizing private parties doing business with the United States from nondiscriminatory state
taxes as a matter of constitutional law."
In Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Evans, 345 U. S. 495
( 1953), the appellant, a private corporation, entered into
a contract, with the United States for a definite fee, to
store government owned gasoline. The Federal Government assumed liability under the contract for all state
taxes. Tennessee levied a special gasoline privilege tax on
the gasoline stored. The United States and the contractor
claimed the tax on the government gasoline was barred by
sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court rejected the con·
tention, citing James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U. S.
134 (1937), for the proposition that merely because the
ueconomic burden" of the tax is transferred to the United
States, because of some contractual provision, the "incidence of the tax" is not thereby imposed on the United
States. The court cogently commented :

"* * * There is no claim of a stated im·
munity. And we find none implied. The United
States, today, is engaged in vast and complicated
operations in business fields, and important purchasing, financial, and contract transactions with
private enterprise. The Constitution does not exSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

tend sovereign exemption from state taxation to
corporations or individuals, contracting with the
United States, merely because their activities are
useful to the Government. We hold, therefore, that
sovereign immunity does not prohibit this tax."
See also Offutt Housing Co. v. Sarpy County, 351 U. S. 253
(1956). It should also be noted that if the tax becomes delinquent it does not become a burden on the exempt property, 59-1:~-75, 76, U. C. A. 1953.
Since the Michigan tax cases have decisively laid to
rest any claim of unconstitutionality in this area, cross-appellant's position is without merit.
POINT III.
SECTION 59-13-73, U. C. A. 1953, IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL, AS BEING IN VIOLATION
OF EITHER THE FEDERAL OR STATE CONSTITUTIONS.
The respondents and cross-appellants contend that Section 59-13-73, U. C. A. 1953, imposes a discriminatory tax
and improperly exempts various classes from the tax, thus
violating Article I, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution and
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.
The trial court decided the issue contrary to their assertions.
Every construction of a statute favors the presumption of constitutionality. Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 3rd Ed., Sec. 4509. This is true whether the statute
is being weighed against the Federal Constitution, Butt..

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

30
field v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470 (1904); Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U. S. 144 (1944); Ex Parte Endo,
323 U. S. 283 (1944), or the Constitution of this state. Salt
Lake City v. Tax Commission, 11 U. 2d 359, 359 P. 2d 397
(1961). Consequently, every presumption favors the position that the instant legislation was drawn with a reasonable view towards constitutionality.
In Untermeyer v. Tax Commission, 102 Utah 214, 129
P. 2d 881, (1942), the Utah Supreme Court stated, as to
the requirement of uniformity in taxation under Article I,
Section 24, of the State Constitution :
"We also hold the tax does not violate the 'uniformity clause' Section 24, Article I, of the state
constitution. The significance of this clause is well
expressed on pp. 818, 819 of Vol. 5, Calif. Jurisprudence where it states:
" 'The word "uniform" in the section of the
constitution under consideration does not mean universal. The provision intends simply that the effect
of general laws shall be the same upon all persons
who stand in the same relation to the law. It has
been repeatedly held that a law is general which
applies to all of a class - the classification being a
proper one - and that the requirements of uniformity is satisfied if it applies to all of the class alike.'
"As applied to taxation statutes such constitutional provision requires only that the tax shall fall
equally upon all similarly situated."
If a proper reason for legislative differentiation or
classification exists, the uniformity provision is not vio·
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lated. State v. Mason, 94 Utah 501, 78 P. 2d 920; State v.
J. B. & R. E. Walker, Inc., 100 Utah 523, 116 P. 2d 766.
The burden of proof of showing a discriminatory classification rests on the plaintiff and intervenor. State v. J. B.
& R. E. ~Valke-r, Inc., supra. A similar standard is imposed
by the equal protection clause of the Federal Constitution.
Thus, in Louisville Gas & E. Co. v. Coleman, 27'7 U. S. 32,
;_;; ( 19:28), the United States Supreme Court stated that a
state's power to classify for purposes of taxation is
... • • of wide range and flexibility."
In Bell's Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232,
237, (1890), the court said that the Constitution does not
prevent a state :

"* * * from adjusting its system of taxation in all proper and reasonable ways. It may, if
it chooses, exempt certa,in classes of property from
any taxation at all, such as churches, libraries and
the property of charitable institutions. It may impose different specific taxes upon different trades
and professions, and may vary the rates of excise
upon various products; it may tax real estate and
personal property in a different manner; it may tax
visible property only, and not tax securities for payment of money; it may allow deductions for indebtedness, or not allow them. All such regulations and
those of like character, so long as they proceed within reasonable limits and general usage, are within
the discretion of the state legislature, * * * "
The claim made below was that the Utah statute denied equal protection of the laws and was not uniform because of an arbitrary classification of exemptions. In order
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for the position of respondents-cross-appellants to be valid
'
the provisions for exemption under the Utah statute, 5913-73, U. C. A. 1953, would have to be arbitrary. In the
trial court, respondents did not contend that all the exemptions were arbitrary, rather only those exemptions were
attacked that relate to religious, educational or charitable
organizations, to the degree they excluded the United
States. It was claimed, relying on the dissenting opinion
of Robson, D. J. in United States and Olin Mathieson Chemical Co. v. Department of Revenue, 202 F. Supp. 757, 761
(Ill. 1962), that the United States was a monumental charity and, therefore, should be treated in a class with other
eleemosynary institutions. The overwhelming weight of
authority is to the contrary.
The general rule in this area is noted in 51 Am. Jur.,
Taxation, Sec. 522 :
"It seems generally to be assumed that constitutional requirements of equality and uniformity in
taxation do not preclude the legislature from providing general tax exemptions for the property of
charitable, educational, and religious institutions
and corporations devoted to public uses and purposes, since through such institutions and co~por~
tions the state is relieved of a burden which It
would otherwise be obliged to bear. * * *"

The United States Supreme Court in Bell's Gap R. Co.
Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232, 237 (1890), expressly so
recognized, and several federal cases have at least implicitly upheld these exemptions. St. Anna's Asylum v. New
Orleans, 105 U. S. 362 (1882); Northwestern University

v.
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v. Illinois, 99 U. S. 309 (1878); Home of the Friendless v.
Rousr. 8 (\Vall) ·130 (1869). There is also no impediment
to such an exemption under Utah law, Parker v. Quinn, 23
Utah 332, 64 Pac. 961 ( 1901); Odd Fellows Bldg. Assn. v.
Naylor, f'>3 Utah 111,177 Pac. 214 (1918); Salt Lake Lodge
v. Grorsbeck, 40 Utah 1, 120 Pac. 192 (1911); Wey v. Salt
Lake City, 35 Utah 504, 101 Pac. 381 (1909); Art. XIII,
St'c. :!, Utah Constitution, 59-2-1, U. C. A. 1953.
In a recent case, exemptions of a similar nature to
those of the Utah statute in question were upheld, being
included in the Illinois Retailers Occupation Tax, in United
States and Olin Mathieson v. Department of Revenue,
(1962, N. D. Ill.). A three judge federal court noted:
"We iterate briefly the principles applied in
our first opinion. Tax exemptions are founded on
public policy and are granted for the accomplishment of public purposes which will benefit the public generally. Tax exemptions are subject to the
limitation that they and the classification upon
which they are based be reasonable, not arbitrary,
and apply to all persons similarly situated.
''The exemption accorded to non-governmental
institutions operated for charitable, religious and
educational purposes is not of recent origin, but is
the continuance of an old and well-established public policy. * * *
"The exemption of these institutions encourages their existence and relieves the State of the
heavy burden of maintaining and performing these
essential services. Article VIII, Sec. 3 of the Constitution of the State of Illinois forbids the use of
public funds in the 'aid of any church or sectarian
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purposes' nor may 'any grant or donation of land,
money or other personal property ever be made by
the state or any such public corporation, to any
church, or for any sectarian purpose.' Obviously, a
distinct dissimilarity exists between religious institutions and governmental bodies. While charitable
and educational objectives can, and are, performed
through governmental units, the revenue to support
them is derived from the power and authority of
the government to tax its citizens for the public welfare. But no compulsory process exists to exact
contributions to non-governmental organizations
dedicated to the moral, spiritual and physical wellbeing of mankind. The financial resources to accomplish their objectives are derived from the concept of giving voluntarily - without legal obligation or compulsion. This difference forms a reasonable basis for a separate classification and the exemption, therefore, does not discriminate against
governmental bodies.
"We are in accord with the holding of the Supreme Court of Illinois that the classification of
governmental units and these non-governmental
units is indeed separate and distinct, and that there
is a reasonable classification based on differences
between them; that Sec. 441 of the Illinois Retailers' Occupation Tax Act which did not exempt retailers who sold to the federal government but did
exempt retailers who sold to charities, schools and
churches is not unconstitutional for that reason."
This decision was affirmed by the United States Supreme
Court, 371 U. S. 21. The Supreme Court apparently rejected in toto Judge Robson's dissent. Consequently, it is
clear that such exemptions as are provided under the
Utah statute result in no constitutional infirmity. See also,
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People n· rd. Holland Coal Co. v. Isaacs, 22 Ill. 2d 477,

176 N. E. 2d 889 (1961). 8
It is obvious that no merit exists to respondents and
cross-appellants' position on this point, and the trial court's
favorable determination should be upheld.

POINT IV.
THERE IS NO DISCRil\JIIN ATION IN APPLICATION OF 59-13-73, U. C. A. 1953 ON ITS
FACE BECAUSE THE UNITED STATES IS
TREATED EQUALLY WITH OTHER GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES AND 59-13-73, U. C.
A. 1953, REPEALS 59-2-2, U. C. A. 1953, TO
THE DEGREE IT IS INCONSISTENT WITH
THE FORMER.
The trial court ruled that 59-13-73, U. C. A. 1953, was
on its face non-discriminatory. This is clearly a correct
result since, as has been noted during the discussion in
this brief on various other points, 59-13-73, U. C. A. 1953,
in no way singles out the United States for any different
treatment than that accorded any other tax exempt entity,
and especially is this so where the State of Utah and the
United States are treated the same under the statute. In
PhiUips Chemical Co. v. Dumas School Dist., 361 U. S. 376
8

Although no attack was raised on other portions of the statute, . it is clear
such recognied legislative diistinc.tions do not constitute unconstitutional
discrimination. McGowan V. Maryland, 3 66 U. S. 420 (1960). The
general exemptions found in the statute have been upheld as valid in various
similar instances. Martin V. Collingswood, 36 N. S. 447, 177 A. 2d 759
(1962) (concession in public park); Rockwell Sprinq f1 Axle Co. v.
Romulus Township. 365 Mich. 632. 114 N. W. 2d 166 (1962) (airport
hangar on state university); Sproul V. Gilbert, 359 P. 2d 543 (Ore.
1961) (grazing on state and federal lands); Rummel V. Musgrave, 350
P. 2d 825 (Colo. 1960) (mining enterprises).
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(1960), the United States Supreme Court had before it a
claim that a Texas statute, imposing a "use" type tax was
discriminatory. However, the statute was entirely different than the statute now before the court. First, a different tax rate was imposed on lessees of state land as distinct
from those of the Federal Government. The court noted
as to the provisions of Texas law involved:
"As construed by a majority of the Texas
court, this provision is an affirmative grant of authority to the State and its political subdivisions to
tax private users of government realty. While the
subject of the tax is the right to the use of the property, i.e., the leasehold, its measure is apparently
the value of the fee. The constitutionality of the
provision, thus construed, depended upon the court's
interpretation of our decisions in the Michigan cases
two terms ago, where we held that a State might
levy a tax on the private use of government property, measured by the full value of the property.
United States v. Detroit, 355 U. C. 466, * * *;
United States v. Township of Muskegon, 355 U.S.
484, * * *; cf. Detroit v. Murray Corp., 355
u. s. 489, * * *.
"However, three members of the Texas court,
joined by a fourth on petition for rehearing, were
of the opinion that under the majority's construction the statute discriminates unconstitutionally
against the United States and its lessees. Their con·
elusion rested on the fact that Article 7173 of the
Revised Civil Statutes of Texas imposes a distinctly
lesser burden on similarly situated lessees of ex·
empted property owned by the State and its politi·
cal subdivisions. We agree with the dissenters'
conclusion.
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"Article 7173 is the only Texas statute other
than Article 5248 which authorizes a tax on lessees.
It provides in part that:
" 'Property held under a lease for a term of
three years or more, or held under a contract for
the purchase thereof, belonging to this state, or that
is exempt by law fron1 taxation in the hands of the
owner thereof, shall be considered for all the purposes of taxation, as the property of the person so
holding the same, except as otherwise specially provided by law.'
"As construed by the Texas courts, Article 7173
is less burdensome than Article 5248 in three respects. First, the measure of a tax under Article
7173 is not the full value of leased tax-exempt premises, as it apparently is under Article 5248, but
only the price the taxable leasehold would bring
at a fair voluntary sale for cash - the value of the
leasehold itself. Second, by its very terms, Article
7173 imposes no tax on a lessee whose lease is for
a term of less than three years. Finally, and crucial here, a lease for three years or longer but subject - like Phillips' - to termination at the lessor's option in the event of a sale is not 'a lease for
a term of three years or more' for purposes of Article 7173. Trammel v. Faught, 74 Tex. 557, 12 S.
\V. 317. Therefore, because of the termination provisions in its lease, Phillips could not be taxed under Article 7173."
None of the factors noted in the cited case are present in
the instant case. State leases are taxed at the same value
as federal leases and 59-13-73, U. C. A. 1953 makes no
distinction between state and federal governmental leases.
59-13-74, U. C. A. 1953, provides:
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"The tax imposed upon such possession or other
beneficial use of tax-exempt property shall be in
the same amount and to the same extent as the ad
valorem property tax would be if the possessor or
user were the owner thereof; provided that there
shall be credited against the tax so imposed upon the
beneficial use of property owned by the federal government the amount of any payments which are
made in lieu of taxes."
The tax imposed in the uniform ad valorem rate, and is
equally applied to all property.
At trial, the respondents-cross-appellants argued that
59-2-2, U. C. A. 1953, carved out an exception for state
lessees and purchasers of state lands under contract. 592-2 provides :
"No tax shall be levied upon lands, the title to
which remains in the state, held or occupied by any
person under a contract of sale or lease from the
state, but this provision shall not be construed to
prevent the taxation of improvements on such lands
and an interest therein to the extent of money paid,
or due, in part payment of the purchase price
thereof, whether an extension of payment has been
granted or not prior to the levying of such tax.
Where final payment has been made upon such
lands, the contract of sale shall, for the purpose of
taxation, be regarded as passing title to the purchaser or assignee, and the state land board shall
immediately certify the receipt of such final payment to the state tax commission."
As can be seen, the tax under this statute on state lands
sold under contract or leased is only to the extent of the
equity and/or improvements of the holder.
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The trial judge found that 59-2-2, U. C. A. 1953, had
been impliedly repealed by 59-13-73, U. C. A. 1953 to the
degree that the latter statute was inconsistent with the
former. Thus, the trial court would properly have 59-2-2,
U. C. A. 1953 apply to the sale or lease of state lands where
the possessor was not using or possessing the lands in conjunction with the business conducted for profit. If the
lands were being used by the contract vendee for such
commerdr.l enterprises, as would invoke 59-13-73, U. C. A.
1953, then they would be subject to the privilege tax valuation, and not just the value of the purchaser's equity. Indeed, were any different construction given the statute a
difference in the tax assessment valuation would exist between lessees and beneficial possessors of federal lands
and those of state lands. This would obviously render the
Privilege Tax discriminatory and hence unconstitutional.
In Phillips Chemical Co. v. Dumas School Dist., 361 U. S.
376 (1960), the United States Supreme Court ruled that
if such a divergence in tax burden existed by state statute,
the assessment on consequent tax would be unconstitutional.
It noted:
"However, all lessees of exempt public lands
would appear to belong to the class defined by Article 7173. In view of the fact that lessees in this
class are taxed because they use exempt property
for a nonexempt purpose, they appear to be similarly situated and presumably should be taxed alike.
Yet by the amendment of Article 5248, the Texas
Legislature segregated federal lessees and imposed
on them a heavier tax burden than is imposed on
the other members of the class by Article 7173. In
this case the resulting difference in tax, attendant
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upon the identity of Phillips' lessor, is extreme; the
State and the School District concede that Phillips
would not be taxed at all if its lessor were the State
or one of its political subdivisions instead of the
Federal Government. The discrimination against
the United States and its lessee seems apparent."
The court noted that the Texas tax was not a tax, the
incidence of which fell upon the United States, and held it
not subject to attack on that basis. However, the court met
the discrimination issue head on, saying:
"It is true that perfection is by no means required under the equal protection test of permissible
classification. But we have made it clear, in the
equal protection cases, that our decisions in that
field are not necessarily controlling where problems
of intergovernmental tax immunity are involved.
In Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, (U. S.)
supra, for example, we noted that the State was
'dealing with [its] proper domestic concerns, and
not trenching upon the prerogatives of the National
Government.' 358 U. S. at 526. When such is the
case, the State's power to classify is, indeed, extremely broad, and its discretion is limited only by
constitutional rights and by the doctrine that a
classification may not be palpably arbitrary. Id.
358 U. S. at 526-528. But where taxation of the
private use of the Government's property is concerned, the Government's interests must be weighed
in the balance. Accordingly, it does not seem too
much to require that the State treat those who deal
with the Government as well as it treats those with
whom it deals inself."

In Moses Lake Homes v. Grant County, 365 U.S. 744
(1961), the United States Supreme Court held a Washing-
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ton tax illegal because the assessment against leaseholds
of federal leases is not the same as leaseholds of state'
leases. The court noted :
"In addition to the weight properly to be accorded to the conclusions of the two courts below
that Washington imposes a higher tax on Wherry
Act leaseholds than on other similar leaseholds, it is
eminently clear that this is so."
Thus, the decision of Judge Jones that 59-13-73, U.
C. A. 1953, repealed 59-2-2, U. C. A. 1953, to the degree of
any inconsistent discrimination avoided any disparity behH'l'n the two stautes, and consequently avoided the decisions of the Moses Lake & Phillips Chemical cases, supra.
The respondents contended this construction was erroneous, but it is submitted the construction was in perfect accord with recognized canons of statutory construction, and the legislative intent and purpose.
If the trial court's construction and findings are erroneous, the burden of proving such impropriety and consequently the burden of proving the general unconstitutionality of the Utah Privilege Tax, 59-13-73, 74, 75, etc., U.
C. A. 1953, rests upon the respondents and cross-appellants.
Thomas v. Daughters of Utah Pioneers, 114 Utah 108, 197
P. 2d 477 (1948). It is also a general canon of statutory
construction that if there are two possible constructions
of a statute, one of which will render the statute constitutional, and the other unconstitutional or render the constitutionality doubtful, the interpretation will be adopted
which will save the statute. Howe v. State Tax CommisSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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sion, 10 U. 2d 362, 353 P. 2d 468 (1960); State Water
Pollution Control Bd. v. Salt Lake City, 6 U. 2d 247, 311
P. 2d 370 (1957); Donahue v. Warner Brothers Pictures, 2
U. 2d 256, 272 P. 2d 177 ( 1954). Most recently in Rothfels
V. Southworth, 11 U. 2d 169, 356 P. 2d 612 ( 1960), this
court noted :

"Closely related to the doctrine just stated is
the well recognized rule of statutory construction
that if statutes can be given different reasonable
interpretations, under one of which they would be
constitutional and under the other their constitutionality would be doubtful, the former will be
adopted. * * *"
Unless the opposite construction is clear and unmistakable, no statute will be struck as being unconstitutional.
Gubler v. Utah State Teachers Retirement Board, 113 Utah
188, 192 P. 2d 580 ( 1948) . All doubts should be resolved
in favor of constitutionality, State v. Guerts, 11 U. 2d 421,
360 P. 2d 1018 (1961); Salt Lake City v. Tax Commission,
11 U. 2d 359, 359 P. 2d 397 (1961). The Supreme Court
must give a statute a construction that will uphold the statute's constitutionality if reasonably possible. Munsee v.
Munsee, 12 U. 2d 83, 363 P. 2d 71; Denver & Rio Grande
Western Railway Company v. Central Weber Sewer Improvement District, 4 U. 2d 105, 287 P. 2d 884; Tygesen
v. Magna Water Company, 119 Utah 274, 226 P. 2d 127;
Newcomb v. Ogden City Public School Teachers Retirement
Commission, 117 Utah 557, 218 P. 2d 287; Allen v. Merrell,
6 U. 2d 32, 305 P. 2d 490. Indeed authority in this juris·
diction requires the courts to be convinced beyond a rea·
sonable doubt before striking the constitutionality of a stat-
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ute. In State Board of Education v. Commission of Finance, 122 Utah 164, 247 P. 2d 435 ( 1952), this court noted:
""' • • It should be borne in mind that we
have a duty to uphold legislative acts unless we are
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that they are
unconstitutional."
It may be generally conceded that repeal by implica-

tion is not favored. Sutherland, Statutory Construction,
Srd Ed., Sec. 2014. However, in the instant case there is
evidence of a real intent on the part of the Legislature to
anticipate implied repeal, especially where necessary to
sustain the overall contemplated statutory purpose. Sutherland, op. cit., Sec. 2014 (1962 Supp.) notes:
"The presumption against implied repeals is
overcome, however, by a showing that the two acts
are irreconcilable, clearly repugnant as to vital matters to which they relate, and so inconsistent that
the two cannot have concurrent operation."
See Golconda Lead Mines v. Null, 82 Idaho 96, 350 P. 2d
221 (1960); Rydalch v. Glauner, 357 P. 2d 1094 (Idaho
1961). Sutherland, supra, Sec. 2012, p. 463, also notes :
"When a subsequent enactment covering a field
of operation coterminous with a prior statute cannot by any reasonable construction be given effect
while the prior law remains in operative existence
because of irreconcilable conflict between the two
acts, the latest legislative expression prevails, and
the prior law yields to the extent of the conflict."
Utah has apparently adopted the above rule. In Union Pac.
R. Co. v. Public Service Commission, 103 Utah 186, 134 P.
2d 469 (1943), the court commented:
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"It is elementary that statutes may be repealed
by implication, and where the provisions of a later
statute are clearly and manifestly repugnant to the
provisions of existing statutes the latter are deemed
repealed to the extent of such repugnancy. * * *"

In the instant case we have just such a repugnancy as
would render 59-13-73, U. C. A. 1953 unconstitutional
in the absence of implied repeal. The construction for
implied repeal (if there has not been an express one)
should, therefore, be favored. 59-2-2, U. C. A. 1953,
was originally enacted as statehood. R. S. 1898, Sec.
2502, and with minor modification (L. 1919, Ch. 113,
Sec. 1: 1921, Ch. 132, Sec. 1), has remained the same
since that time. On the other hand, 59-13-73, U. C. A. 1953,
was passed after the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in the Michigan cases, referred to heretofore.
It was part of a general effort on the part of states all
over the country to avail themselves of this new available
source of revenue to meet their increased tax demands.
The Aftermath Of The Michigan Tax Decisions: State
Taxation of Federal Property and Activities, 13 Military
L. Rev. 167, 169 (1961). The Utah statute was closely
patterned on the Michigan statute and was aimed at covering all sources of tax revenue which had otherwise escaped assessment because the title, as distinct from the
beneficial use, rested in a tax exempt entity. The act was
passed by the 1959 Legislature in Special Session, Chapter
5, Sec. 4 ( SS) . The act became effective December 31,
1959 (L. 1959 (SS), Ch. 5, Sec. 6). It was specific legislation and subsequent in time to the previous statute re·
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lating to state lands. Since 59-13-73, U. C. A. 1953 was
later in time, more extensive in scope and specific in purpost>, it would govern in the face of an irreconcilable conflict. In State v. Betensen, 14 U. 2d 121, 378 P. 2d 669
( 1963), this court commented on a later statute requiring
county attorneys to be licensed, qualified attorneys where
a prior statute, still on the books, apparently exempted
them:
"* * * This provision, incidentally, was not
expressly repealed by the statute here in question.
Although if the latter were a valid enactment, it
would undoubtedly supersede the former as being
in conflict and later in time. * * *"
Consequently, the factual pattern of the statutes here
in question being of the same nature, leads to the conclusion that 59-13-73, U. C. A. 1953, impliedly repeals 59-2-2,
U. C. A. 1953, to the extent of any inconsistency. The trial
court's obviously correct construction should stand.
However, an additional reason offers much impetus
for reaching such a conclusion. 59-13-77, U. C. A. 1953,
the last provision in the Privilege Tax Act, provides :
"Nothing contained herein shall be construed
as limiting or repealing the exemptions granted in
sections 59-2-4, 59-2-5, 59-2-6, 59-2-7, 59-2-8, 59-2-9,
59-2-12 and 59-2-13 Utah Code Annotated 1953."
This section expressly limits the applicability of 59-13-73,
U. C. A. 1953, etc. in the face of the exemptions in Title
59, Chapter 2. However, 59-2-2, U. C. A. 1953, is not mentioned, obviously demonstrating a legislative intention that
the provisions of the Privilege Tax Act would limit or repeal the exemptions of 59-2-2, U. C. A. 1953 to the degree
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of any inconsistency. By not mentioning 59-2-2, but mentioning and exempting other companion provisions, the Legislature obviously intended a repeal of any inconsistency
between 59-13-73 and those statutes not mentioned. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. This is as much as an
express repeal. A fortiori, the trial court's construction was
in full accord with constitutional law, canons of statutory
construction, and the legislative purpose and intent. 4
POINT V.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING
THAT THERE HAD BEEN SUCH A DISCRIMINATORY APPLICATION OF 59-13-73, U. C. A.
1953, AS TO VOID THE ASSESSMENT AND
TAX, AND EVEN ASSUMING SUCH FINDING
WAS PROPER, THE COURT ERRED IN THE
RELIEF GRANTED.
The trial court made a finding that the application of
the privilege tax under 59-13-73, U. C. A. 1953, was discriminatory and that, as a consequence, the levy was "illegal and void" (R. 250). The court in its oral findings
stated the basis of the alleged discrimination (R. 200):

"* * * These state land contracts, gentlemen, under the stipulation of the parties there are
about 200 or some such number of these contracts
4Respondents' assertion of an administrative interp~etation to the cont~ry
is not well founded since: ( 1) There was no ev1dence of a contrary ~~
terpretation. (2) Even if local assessors had so construed t~e statutes ~IS
is hardly binding or persuasive constt:nction. (3) No long htstory of legiS·
lative acquiescence exists. In addition, at least one assessor had construed
the statutes the same as Judge Jones, this was the Kane County A~~·
This fact was not known till after trial, but is a proper subject of JUdiCial
notice.
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that the court has examined, which if the court recalls correctly there's about that number where the
purchaser of these state lands in 1961 placed those
lands to commercial use. The court finds from the
stipulation that this was a commercial use, but
nothing was done collectively by those tax people.
I'll just treat them collectively as tax people, because the Tax Commission ~as supervisory duties
under the Constitution and the assessor has, I guess,
primary responsibility. But collectively in all the
counties of the state there apparently has been a
studied indifference over these state land contracts,
and notwithstanding the fact that the Land Board
is across the hall or on another floor, somehow or
other, though these lands are being used for grazing of animals and used in commercial practice, in
not one instance, if the court recalls the record correctly, has any assessment been made under this
privilege tax.
"Now the court is just simply impelled into the
conclusion that so long as the state is going to continue to practice such discrimination, the least this
court can do is to raise its voice in protest and decide in favor of the plaintiff and find that the tax
has been discriminatorily applied and with reluctance direct that the money be returned with the interest provided by statute. * * *"
It ruled that because of such action, the assessment
against Thiokol was nullified (R. 201) and void (R.
250), and that Thiokol was entitled to the return of all
monies paid under protest. It is submitted that this determination was error in two respects. First, it is submitted
that the trial court erred in finding that there was sufficient evidence of discrimination as to warrant the court in
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granting relief; and, second, it is submitted that the relief
granted was improper.
As respects the first point, the evidence disclosed that
none of the lands which the State of Utah had sold, under
certificate of sale but retaining title in the State, had been
taxed under 59-13-73, Utah Code Annotated 1953, at their
full value rather than the purchaser's equity. 5 No evidence
was introduced to show that any federal contracts of sale
of public lands had been taxed differently in a similar situation nor, additionally, was there any evidence that lands
under contract of sale from other tax exempt entities had
been taxed. No evidence was introduced to show the proportion the state lands bore to all the property taxable under
59-13-73, U. C. A. 1953. Thiokol was taxed on personal property not realty and holds such property by permit of contract
not a contract of sale. Consequently, there could be no direct injury to Thiokol or the United States by the failure
to tax state contract lands, since there was no evidence that
either respondent had any similar property in that category that was taxed. Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Evans,
supra. 84 C. J. S., Taxation, Sec. 36. If any injury
can be claimed, it could only be claimed because of
the fact that such state lands come generally within the
category of taxable properties under the statute, which is
insufficient to show discrimination injurious to respondents. Moreover, it is submitted that the evidence of dis·
crimination, if the above be such, was not of a nature as
5Qutside of Kane County, which appellant understands did tax cont~~
lands 59-13-73, U. C. A. 19 53, no dispute is made by appellant WI
this finding.
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would constitute legal discrimination entitling the respondents to relief. There was not one scintilla of evidence to
show an intentional discrimination against the respondents.
The only evidence with respect to the intent or attitude of
any county assessor was the testimony of Fred L. Peterson,
the Box Elder County Assessor (R. 139, et seq.). He testified that upon receipt of the list of state lands, he computed the equity of the purchaser and assessed for the year
( R. l·ll). He made no visual inspection of the lands, but
did make reference to a map that had been prepared a few
years earlier to aid in his assessment (R. 143, 154). He
had no specific knowledge of what use was being made of
lands by any contract vendee (R. 156). He further testified (R. 157) :
"Q. Mr. Peterson, was it your understanding
that users of property owned by the State of Utah
as well as users of property owned by the United
States of America were subject to the tax provided
for by section 59-13-73 of the Utah Code when you
made your assessments for the year 1961?

"A. Would that apply to what the land is used
for and the assessed"Q. Assuming that the land was being used in
connection with a business for profit.

"A. All livestock ranging on this exempt land
are all assessed. That together with the equipment,
camps, and otherwise used on this land is assessed.
"Q.

Assessed under what section of the Code?

"A. I don't know the Code, but then that just the same as other properties are assessed.
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"Q.

They're assessed as personal property?

"A.

As personal property, yes, sir.

"Q. And they were assessed in the same manner after December 31, 1959, as they were prior to
that?

"A.

That's right, yes, sir.

"Q. So the manner and extent to which you
assess such property was not changed by the advent
of section 59-13-73 of the Utah Code, to which reference was made at the assessors' school held in
December of 1959, and in this exhibit seven which
you looked at earlier?

"A. Well, that's a long time to remember, but
I've interpreted that to mean that it would apply to,
as I say, livestock and equipment or otherwise used
on this particular property, would be assessed at its
value as other property.
"Q. But not assessed because it was government property that was being used; the livestock
was not government property, was it?

"A.

No, sir.

"Q. It was being assessed as property of the
livestock operator?

"A.

That's right.

"Q. And the land which the State of Utah
owned and which the livestock operator has pur·
chased under contract was not assessed to him?

"A.

Just the equity."
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He had made inquiry as to one piece of property under
lease by Brigham City, a gravel pit, and was informed that
it was taxable ( R. 177), but had failed to tax it due to
..oversight" (R. 179). Therefore, his testimony directly
shows that any failure to tax other properties than state
contract lands was oversight, and as to state lands under
contract, he did not know the law made them taxable under
59-1::>·73, U. C. A. 1953.
The director of the property tax division of the State
Tax Commission, Mr. Max H. Kerr, testified that state
policy was to tax all lands that the Tax Commission was
made aware of that would be properly taxed (R. 98). He
testified ( R. 98) :
"A. There's no difference between whether it
is owned by the federal government or any other
so-called exempt owner.
"Q. Otherwise then there is a general acrossthe-board exercise of this tax rather than attempting to pinpoint it into any particular tax exempt
entity; is that correct?

"A. That is true."
He further testified that when the act was passed, the state
set up an assessor's school and expressly advised assessors
that private possessory interest of persons holding from
government and other non-taxable entities were to be taxed
(R. 99). No policy of exclusion of state lands was directed
or intended by the State (R. 100). He testified that he had
never considered the question of whether installment con-
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tract purchases of state lands would or would not be subject to taxation (R. 106) :
"A. I don't think that I have specifically considered that hypothetical case before."
Clearly, the evidence allows for only two assumptions.
First, as to any specific property leased by a municipality
or other tax exempt entity, any failure to assess and tax
the holder in accordance with 59-13-73, U. C. A. 1953,
where the holder could be validly assessed, was due to mere
oversight. Second, as to contract vendees of state lands,
using or possessing the lands in conjunction with a business
conducted for profit, any failure to tax was due to a mistake or oversight in the coverage of the law. The general
rule of law in this area is summarized in 84 C. J. S., Taxation, Sec. 30, p. 103 :

"* * * Since equality of assessment is an
ideal which is impossible of realization, as discussed
supra subdivision a of this section, it has been
held that, in the assessment of property, mere omissions, mistakes, oversights, or errors of judgment of
the taxing officials in the exercise of an honest
judgment will not invalidate the assessment; but
there must be something more, something which in
effect amounts to an intentional violation of the
principle of practical uniformity, which may be
made out by showing that other property was uniformly and systematically assessed at a percentage
of its fair cash value lower than that of the complaining party. In other words, unlawful discr~
ination by tax officials consists, not merely of mistake or lack of diligence in seeking out those who
are subject to tax, but of an intentional discrimination adopted as a practice."
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In this state the rule was expressed in Continental
Nat·ional Bank of Salt Lake City v. Naylor, 54 Utah 49,
179 P. 67:
''We find no substantial evidence whatever of
intention or design on the part of the assessor or
board of equalization to discriminate against appellant and other banks, or their stockholders, by
the adoption of wrong principles, standards, or
methods, or in any other respect. Even if we could
find that there was some apparent discrimination
in point of fact by which appellant and other banks
and their stockholders were required to pay something more than was required of taxpayers on some
other classes of property, still, as we understand
the authorities, appellant would have no standing in
a court of equity to restrain the collection of the
tax unless the discrimination resulted from wrong
principles, methods, or standards, willfully and intentionally adopted. Discriminations resulting from
mistake, inadvertence, and miscalculations or error
of judgment must be remedied in some other form
of proceeding than the one adopted by appellant in
the case at bar." (Emphasis added.)
In Alfred J. Su:eet, Inc. v. City of Auburn, 180 Atl. 803
(Me., 1935), the Supreme Court of Maine stated:
"(In cases involving attacks on assessment)
(t)he burden is on the petitioner to show that the
valuation is unjust, not on the assessors to establish that their figures are correct. The presumption
is that the assessment is valid. Penobscot Chemical
Fibre Co. v. Inhabitants of the Town of Bradley,
99 Me. 263, 59 A. 83; Spear v. City of Bath, supra;
City of Roanoke v. Williams, supra; Sunday Lake
Iron Co. v. Township of Wakefield, 247 U. S. 350,
38 S. Ct. 495, 62 L. Ed. 1154.
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"It is furthermore generally recognized that it
is not sufficient to show merely that the taxing
board has made an error, even though such mistake
may result in a lack of uniformity. Penobscot
Chemical Fibre Co. v. Inhabitants of the Town of
Bradley, supra; Maish v. Territory of Arizona, 164
U. S. 599, 17 S. Ct. 193, 41 L. Ed. 567; Sioux City
Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U. S. 441, 43 S.
Ct. 190, 67 L. Ed. 340, 28 A. L. R. 979. The reason
for such a doctrine is obvious. Mathematical precision is impossible in dealing with taxable values.
Uniformity can only be approximated. The court
is not a board of review to correct errors. It is solely
where there is evident a systematic purpose on the
part of a taxing board to cast a disproportionate
share of the public burden on one taxpayer, or one
class of taxpayers, that the court will intervene. In
Shawmut Manufacturing Co. v. Town of Benton,
123 Me. 121, 130, 122 A. 49, 53, this principle has
been definitely enunciated in the following language,
quoting with approval the words of Chief Justice
Taft in Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County,
supra: 'The proving of a mere error of human
judgment, as has been indicated, will not support
a claim of overrating; "there must be something
more-something which in effect amount to an intentional violation of the essential principle of practical uniformity."'"

The federal rule is no different, the evidence must
manifest a clear and intentional discrimination before the
assessment is held to violate the Equal Protection Clause.
In Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U. S. 441,
447 (1923), the United States Supreme Court commented
that:
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••• • • mere errors of judgment do not support a claim of discrimination, but that there must
be something more,-something which, in effect,
amounts to an intentional violation of the essential
principle of practical uniformity. Sunday Lake Iron
Co. v. Walkefield Twp., 247 U. S. 350, 353, 62 L.
Ed. 1154, 1156, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 495."
In Su.nday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield, 247 U. S. 350, 352
( 1918), the court noted:
uThe purpose of the equal protection clause of
the 14th Amendment is to secure every person within the· state's jurisdiction against intentional and
arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by express terms of a statue or by its improper execution
through duly constituted agents. And it must be
regarded as settled that intentional systematic undervaluation by state officials of other taxable property in the same class contravenes the constitutional
right of one taxed upon the full value of his property."
Consequently, unless the conduct of state officials is an
intentional and systematic discrimination against one taxpayer in the same tax class, no violation of the Equal Protection Clause or uniformity provisions is made out. See
Inequality in Property Tax Assessments: New Cures for
ata Old Ill. 75 Harvard L. Rev. 1374 (1962).
Applying the above rules to the instant case, it is clear
that no evidence was before the trial court of any deliberate, intentional, systematic exclusion. What in fact there
was, was an oversight as to some property, and a mistake
as to the extent of the application of a new law. Certainly,
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this is not sufficient evidence of discrimination to sustain
an attack against an assessment, especially where there
was no showing that similar property of the same class of
the plaintiff or intervenor had been taxed.
Finally, it is submitted that even if the evidence were
sufficient to sustain a claim of discrimination, the remedy
the trial court granted the respondents, to wit: return of
all monies paid, was improper. It was urged by the respondents at trial that if such discrimination were shown, it
would render the assessment void. Reliance for that position was placed on Moses Lake Homes v. Grant County, 365
U. S. 744 (1961); and Phillips Chemical Co. v. Dumas, 361
u. s. 376 (1960).
In Moses Lake Homes, the court noted:
"In addition to the weight properly to be accorded to the conclusions of the two courts below
that Washington imposes a higher tax on Wherry
Act leaseholds than on other similar leaseholds, it
is eminently clear that this is so."
In the Phillips Chemical Co. case, the Supreme Court
stated:
"As construed by the Texas courts, Article 7173
is less burdensome than Article 5248 in three re·
spects."
Where there is statutory discrimination, this would
obviously be unconstitutional, and hence void. But, the
situation in the instant case does not involve a decision of
the court of prima facie disharmony. Rather, the court
ruled all properties were covered under 59-13-73, Utab
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Code Annotated 1953, and should be taxed at full value.
Therefore, in the instant case, the discrimination, if any,
is one of administrative misapplication. In such cases, it
is clear that the remedy of the taxpayer is not to have returned all his money, since this would put him in a better
position than others and all he is entitled to is to be placed
in a generally equal position. Therefore, the courts allow
a reduction to the level of other properties assessed. In
Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, supra, the Supreme Court ruled :

'' * * * This court holds that the right of
the taxpayer whose property alone is taxed at 100
per cent of its true value is to have his assessment
reduced to the percentage of that value at which
others are taxed, even though this is a departure
from the requirement of statute. The conclusion is
based on the principle that where it is impossible
to secure both the standards of the true value, and
the uniformity and equality required by law, the
latter requirement is to be preferred as the just and
ultimate purpose of the law."
See also Township of Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U. S.
620 (1945). In Des Moines Bank v. Bennett, 284 U. S. 239
(1931), the Supreme Court did not declare the assessment
void where discrimination was found, but allowed petitioners to obtain "the excess of taxes exacted from them." In
Cumberland Coal Co. v. Board, 284 U. S. 23, 30 (1931), the
Supreme Court, after finding discrimination, ruled :
"The petitioners are entitled to a readjustment
of the assessments of their coal so as to put these
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sessments of the coal of the same class within the
tax district."
Several state courts have assumed a similar rule. In re
Brooks Building, 391 Pa. 94, 137 A. 2d 273 (1958); In the
Matter of Kents, 34 N. J. 21, 166 A. 2d 763 (1961). It is
noted in 75 Harvard L. Rev. 1374, 1376, supra:

"* * * As a result of these Supreme Court
decisions, the state courts generally have recognized
-albeit with startling exceptions-that the Four·
teenth Amendment forbids intentionally unequal assessment as between properties of the same class
and entitles a taxpayer who has proved such discrimination to a reduction to the level at which comparable parcels have been assessed." (McCluskey
v. Sparks, 80 Ariz. 15, 291 P. 2d 791 (1955); Anderson v. Dunn, 180 Kan. 811, 308 P. 2d 154
( 1957); Baldwin Const. Co. v. Essex County Bd. of
Taxation, 16 N. J. 329, 108 A. 2d 598 (1954) .)
Consequently, if there was in fact discrimination, the
court should have determined the percentage value that the
assessment to Thiokol bore to the average percentage assessment to the non-assessed property and granted a reduction,
if any, in the excess amount and judgment only for that
amount. This court could direct such action if it deemed
it proper.
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CONCLUSION
The trial court obviously was correct in upholding the
constitutionality of 59-13-73, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
and ruling that it impliedly repealed 59-2-2, Utah Code Annotated 1953, to the extent of conflict. However, the trial
court erred in finding sufficient intentional discrimination,
or, in the alternative, in the relief awarded.
It is submitted this court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted,
A. PRATT KESLER,
Attorney General,
RONALD N. BOYCE,
Chief Assistant Attorney General,
0. DEE LUND,
Box Elder County Attorney,
Attorneys for Appellant.
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